

Message Text

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 13, 1973

(SALT TWO -354)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF NOVEMBER 13, 1973.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

NOVEMBER 13, 1973

MR. MINISTER:

ON NOVEMBER 6, 1973, THE SOVIET SIDE AGAIN RAISED THE ISSUE
OF NON-CENTRAL NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS, REITERATING ITS PROPOSALS
FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US FORCES DEPLOYED IN DIRECT SUPPORT
OF ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS. TODAY, I SHALL RESPOND TO YOUR REMARKS
ON THIS SUBJECT AND ONCE AGAIN MAKE CLEAR THE US POSITION ON THE
ISSUE OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

THERE IS A WIDE VARIETY OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS IN THE
FORCES OF BOTH SIDES. THESE WEAPONS HAVE WIDELY VARYING
CHARACTERISTICS BOTH IN TERMS OF THE ROLES THEY ARE INTENDED TO
FULFILL AND IN TERMS OF THEIR TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES. IT IS IN-
CONTESTABLE THAT SOME OF THESE WEAPONS ARE MORE POWERFUL, AND SOME
OF THESE, IN TURN, ARE POTENTIALLY MORE DESTABILIZING THAN OTHERS.

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IT IS ALSO INCONTESTABLE THAT IT IS ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS

WHICH DRIVE THE ARMS COMPETITION BETWEEN US. THE POTENTIAL OF OTHER NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS IS, BECAUSE OF THEIR LIMITED CAPABILITIES, OF ENTIRELY A DIFFERENT AND LOWER ORDER THAN THAT OF ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS AND CANNOT BE COMPARED TO THEM. IT IS BECAUSE THE LATTER ARE THE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE CENTRAL TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE THAT WE HAVE REFERRED TO THEM AS "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" AND REFERRED TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS AS "NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS." NO MATTER WHAT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM MAY BE USED, THE FACT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES REMAINS.

THE US NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE SEEKS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN ARE DEPLOYED AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE DEFENSIVE FORCES WHICH SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCES. THESE US FORCES ARE NOT A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY SERVE TO STABILIZE REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCES. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US NON-CENTRAL FORCES WOULD WORK BASIC CHANGES IN THESE REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCES, BUT WOULD LEAVE UNCHANGED THE FORCES OF ONE SIDE. WITHOUT HERE GOING INTO THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT LED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS, IT IS CLEAR THAT YOUR PROPOSAL WOULD UPSET THAT DEGREE OF STABILITY PROVIDED BY THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. THE FACT THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL MIGHT OCCUR IN STAGES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY ALTER THIS CONCLUSION. THE US CANNOT CONSIDER PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE SECURITY OF ITS ALLIES OR ITS ABILITY TO SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS TO ITS ALLIANCES.

AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE MAY, 1972 DOCUMENT ON "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS" EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT THOSE PRINCIPLES "DO NOT AFFECT ANY OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER COUNTRIES EARLIER ASSUMED BY THE USA AND THE USSR." MOREOVER, THE JUNE, 1973 "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS", ALSO AGREED TO AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BY BOTH SIDES, REAFFIRMED THE MAY, 1972 "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS" AND ADDED THAT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS "BOTH SIDES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS" WHICH, AS THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE CLEAR, INCLUDE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ITS ALLIES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF US NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS IS CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES. IT IS ALSO HARD FOR ME TO RECONCILE THE POSITION YOU HAVE TAKEN IN THIS REGARD WITH WHAT I NOTE GENERAL

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SECRETARY BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS SPEECH OF OCTOBER 26, 1973 -- NAMELY, "FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE FUTURE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. IF ANYONE SHOULD TRY TO VIOLATE THIS PRINCIPLE, THEN THE WHOLE QUESTION WILL BECOME AN APPLE OF DISCORD AND THE SUBJECT OF ENDLESS DISPUTES."

MR. MINISTER, CONTRARY TO THE SOVIET CLAIM, THE US SIDE HAS NOT IGNORED THE ISSUE OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. WE HAVE GIVEN

CAREFUL THOUGH TO THE CONSIDERATION PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET SIDE AND HAVE PROPOSED A SOLUTION WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED IN MOSCOW IN MAY, 1972 AND IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE, 1973 AND WHICH MEETS THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

ON MAY 15, 1973, I STATED THAT, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, THE US SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER RECIPROCAL ASSURANCES TO THE EFFECT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD MEET THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS NOT LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT. I EXPLAINED THAT SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD NOT AFFECT EXISTING OBLIGATIONS OF EITHER SIDE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER COUNTRIES. SUCH AN APPROACH IS NOT AIMED AT CONFIRMING A SUBSTANTIVE INEQUALITY, AS ALLEGED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AIMED AT ASSURING A STABLE STRATEGIC SITUATION. MR. MINISTER, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE US PROPOSAL PROVIDES THE ONLY FEASIBLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. JOHNSON

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